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NOTING THE ABSENCE: THE DILEMMA OF CORPORATE VENUE 
IN MISSOURI WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 
WHEN SPECIFIC STATUTES FAIL TO DEFINE RESIDENCE 
MATTHEW J. DEVOTI* 
STEVEN D. RINEBERG** 
INTRODUCTION 
“Venue in Missouri is determined solely by statute.”1  Venue refers to the 
situs in which a court of competent jurisdiction may adjudicate an action.2  
 
* Matthew J. Devoti attended Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri and earned his law degree 
from Saint Louis University School of Law.  Devoti joined Casey & Meyerkord as an associate in 
1998.  Devoti is a member of the Missouri Bar Association, the Lawyers Association of St. Louis, 
the Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys, and the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis 
and serves on the Executive Committee of the Lawyers Association and the Young Lawyers 
Section Counsel of the Missouri Bar.  Devoti is a graduate of the Missouri Bar Leadership 
Academy, class of 2001-2002, and teaches a course in Trial Procedures and Techniques at the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis. 
** Steven D. Rineberg attended Western Illinois University in Macomb, Illinois and is a 2002 
graduate of Saint Louis University School of Law, where he also served as an editor for the Saint 
Louis University Law Journal.  Rineberg has previously published an article in the Law Journal 
regarding corporate venue in Missouri and has co-authored an article with Stephen F. Meyerkord 
for The Missouri Trial Attorney on the topic of hospital liability.  I would like to thank my 
parents, Dennis and Janice Rineberg, for all of their love and support.  And to my wife, Laura 
Mae, thank you for always making me smile. 
 1. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).  
Judge Wolff noted in his concurrence in State ex rel. Smith v. Gray that “venue statutes have been 
with us since the earliest days of the Louisiana territory.”  979 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1998) (en 
banc) (Wolff, J., concurring) (citing LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISANA, Ch. 38 (1807)).  
For a statutory analysis of the development of venue in Missouri, see Craig A. Adoor & Joseph J. 
Simeone, The Law of Venue in Missouri, 32 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 639 (1988); see also Steven D. 
Rineberg, Comment, Twisted Currents: Navigating Through Corporate Venue in Missouri and 
the Quest to Simplify Its Construction, 45 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 1055, 1064-70 (2001). 
There are a variety of special venue provisions aside from those enumerated in Chapter 508 that 
indicate where a suit may be brought, hence “attorneys filing suit in Missouri pursuant to a 
particular act should look to the venue provisions of that act.”  Adoor & Simeone, supra, at 639 
n.4; see also Smith, 979 S.W.2d at 194 (Wolff, J., concurring) (indicating that there are “some 53 
statutory sections specifying venue in particular situations”).  This Comment will focus 
particularly on those venue statutes relating to the residence of domestic business corporations, 
insurance corporations, not-for-profit corporations, and foreign business corporations. 
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Locating the situs of a cause of action in a hospitable forum is important to 
both plaintiffs and defendants.  Hence, venue is a catalyst for litigation in 
Missouri.3  Corporate residence for venue purposes is one particular aspect of 
venue that has repeatedly resulted in litigation.4 
“Nearly all Missouri venue statutes can be readily understood by reading 
the language of the statutes themselves.  By contrast, [however], venue 
provisions relating to corporations require an understanding of the statutory 
language, the Missouri business corporations statute, and decisions of [the 
Missouri Supreme Court].”5  While previous attention was paid to Missouri 
courts’ construction of the state’s venue statutes with respect to corporate 
residence,6 this Comment more narrowly focuses on the dilemma created when 
specific statutes fail to define the residence of foreign corporations and, to 
some extent, that of not-for-profit corporations.  The three above-mentioned 
factors referenced by Judge Wolff in State ex rel. Smith v. Gray7 will therefore 
play an integral role in this Comment’s analysis of the corporate venue 
dilemma. 
Part I of this Comment presents a brief overview of the development of 
law in Missouri regarding corporate residence for venue purposes.  Part II 
analyzes the distinction between domestic business corporations and insurance 
corporations for purposes of corporate residence.  That part illustrates the 
development of corporate residence with respect to insurance corporations and 
 
 2. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 196.  The concept of venue differs from that of 
jurisdiction, as “jurisdiction relates to the power of the court to hear and determine the case.”  
Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co., 646 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), overruled by 
State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).  Richardson 
v. Richardson succinctly captured the essence of DePaul Health Center’s overruling of Sullenger 
when it noted: “There is no longer any requirement that the suit be filed in a ‘proper’ court and 
filing in a court of improper venue does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the defendant.”  
892 S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 822).  
Today, section 476.410 provides that “when a trial court finds venue to be improper, the case 
must be transferred to a circuit where venue is proper, rather than be dismissed.”  Rothermich, 
816 S.W.2d at 197; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 476.410 (2000). 
 3. See DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 820.  Judge Robertson likened the case as just 
“another in a seemingly unending series of extraordinary writ actions in which civil tort plaintiffs 
and defendants enter protracted procedural plotting to embrace or avoid the generous juries of the 
City of St. Louis.”  Id. 
 4. See State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 131 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1939) (en banc); State ex 
rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc); State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 
265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 
1962) (en banc); State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) 
(en banc); Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d 194; DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d 820; Smith, 979 
S.W.2d 190. 
 5. Smith, 979 S.W.2d at 194 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 6. Rineberg, supra note 1, at 1055. 
 7. Smith, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Wolff, J. concurring). 
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why, absent statutory guidance, the residence of insurance corporations for 
venue purposes is any county where it maintains an office or agent for the 
transaction of its business.  Part II therefore lays the foundation for the 
discussion undertaken in Parts III and IV, which apply the domestic 
business/insurance corporation distinction to the issues of corporate residence 
for foreign corporations, and reviews the recent decision by the Missouri 
Supreme Court in State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill8 regarding 
not-for-profit corporations.  Part V then proposes that the Missouri Supreme 
Court should apply the domestic business/insurance corporation distinction 
when deciding the issue of foreign corporation residence.  In conclusion, Part 
VI establishes that, in the absence of a statute-based definition of residence, the 
residence of any corporation, in particular a foreign business corporation 
should be the location of its office or agents for the conduct of its usual and 
customary business. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERAL BUSINESS CORPORATION’S RESIDENCE 
FOR VENUE PURPOSES 
“The primary purpose of Missouri’s venue statutes is to provide a 
convenient, logical and orderly forum for the resolution of disputes.”9  Rarely 
has there been confusion about venue when a corporation is the sole defendant 
or when there are multiple defendants, all of which are corporations.  Under 
such circumstances, section 508.040 of the Missouri Revised Statutes is the 
applicable venue statute.10  Section 508.040 provides in pertinent part: 
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the 
cause of action accrued, . . . or in any county where such corporations shall 
have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and 
customary business.11 
 
 8. State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, No. SC 84092, 2002 WL 1364121 (Mo. 
June 25, 2002) (en banc). 
 9. State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). 
 10. See State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (“The statute 
applies . . . when the only defendant is a single corporation, but to declare that it has no 
application when there are plural defendants, all corporations, is to ignore the broad language 
with which the statute begins.”).  See also State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 
S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (holding that “[w]here all of the defendants are 
corporations, . . . the corporate venue statute applies”). 
 11. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000).  The first corporate venue statute in Missouri dates to 
1845.  See MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34 (1845).  The current language of the corporate venue statute 
dates to 1866 and has remained unchanged since 1903.  See MO. REV. STAT. tit. XXIV, ch. 62, § 
26 (1866), providing: “Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where 
the cause of action accrued, or in any county where such corporations shall have or usually keep 
an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business.”  See also 1903 Mo. 
Laws 115, which included the additional language that “or in the case the corporation defendant 
is a railroad . . . running into or through two or more counties in this state, then in either of such 
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Pursuant to the corporate venue statute, venue is determined by the location of 
an office or agent for the transaction of the usual and customary business of the 
corporation.12 
The confusion about corporate venue arises from the situation when a 
plaintiff joins an individual defendant with one or more corporate defendants.  
Missouri courts have long held that under such circumstances, section 508.010 
of the Missouri Revised Statutes is the applicable venue statute.13  Generally, 
when a corporation is joined with an individual defendant, “the general venue 
statute, rather than [section] 508.040, which deals with suits against 
corporations, has been held to be the applicable statute.”14  The general venue 
statute provides: 
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be 
brought: 
1. When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county 
within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the 
plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found; 
2. When there are several defendants, and they reside in different 
counties, the suit may be brought in any such county; 
3. When there are several defendants, some residents and others 
nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this 
state in which any defendant resides; 
4. When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit may be 
brought in any county in this state; 
5. Any action, local or transitory, in which any county shall be plaintiff, 
may be commenced and prosecuted to final judgment in the county in 
which the defendant or defendants reside, or in the county suing and 
where the defendants, or one of them, may be found; 
 
counties” venue would be proper.  For an abbreviated, yet informative, discussion on the 
development of the corporate venue statute, see Webb, 561 S.W.2d at 114-15. 
 12. “The venue statute . . . does not consider the amount of business transacted by a 
domestic corporation in a specific county.  It focuses, instead, on the office of the agent for the 
transaction of business.”  Wadlow v. Donald Lindner Homes, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1983) (emphasis added).  But see State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, No. SC 
84092, 2002 WL 1364121 (Mo. June 25, 2002) (en banc). 
 13. See State ex rel. Columbia Nat’l Bank v. Davis, 284 S.W. 464 (Mo. 1926) (en banc) 
(pioneering the discussion of the general venue/corporate venue distinction).  In Columbia 
National Bank, the Supreme Court of Missouri held: “Section [508.010.2] fixes the venue of civil 
actions against corporations where they are joined as defendants with one or more other 
defendants and . . . [s]ection [508.040] fixes such venue only in actions where the corporation 
defendant is the sole defendant.”  Id. at 470.  But see SSM Health Care St. Louis, 2002 WL 
1364121. 
 14. State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). 
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6. In all tort actions the suit may be brought in the county where the 
cause of action accrued regardless of the residence of the parties, and 
process therein shall be issued by the court of such county and may 
be served in any county within the state; provided, however, that in 
any action for defamation or for invasion of privacy the cause of 
action shall be deemed to have accrued in the county in which the 
defamation or invasion was first published.15 
Under sections 508.010.2 and .3, either of which may govern when a 
corporation and an individual are joined as defendants, “residence” of the 
corporate defendant is the criterion for venue – not the location of its office or 
agents for the conduct of business.16  “[T]he legislature’s desire to make 
residency determinative is evident from section 508.010’s use of residency as a 
key factor in determining venue.”17  Thus, there exists a fundamental question 
when operating under either section 508.010.2 or .3: What is the residence of a 
corporation for venue purposes when both a corporation and an individual are 
joined as defendants? 
A. Corporate Residence in Missouri Prior to 1943 
Until 1943, “no Missouri statute defined the ‘residence’ of corporations for 
venue purposes.”18  Prior to that date, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the 
common law rule that “a corporation’s residence may be wherever its 
corporate business is done.”19  In State ex rel. Henning v. Williams,20 the court 
considered the location of the corporate defendant’s residence under section 
508.010.21 
The court in Henning was forced to reconcile the predecessors to section 
508.010 and section 508.040.22  Consequently, the court determined that since 
 
 15. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000). 
 16. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.3 (2000). 
 17. State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 864 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (Stith, J., 
concurring) (commenting on the principal opinion’s approach and noting that under section 
508.010, “no particular defendant has a right to have a case venued in the county where he or she 
resides”). 
 18. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 19. Id. (citations omitted). 
 20. State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 131 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1939) (en banc).  In Henning, 
the plaintiff brought suit against an individual resident of St. Charles County and Shell Petroleum 
Corporation, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Missouri.  Id. at 562.  The corporate 
defendant maintained an office for the transaction of its business in the City of St. Louis.  Id.  
Since there was a mix of corporate and individual defendants, the court in Henning relied on the 
decision rendered in Columbia National Bank for determining that section 508.010 was the 
applicable venue statute.  Id; see also supra note 13. 
 21. Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 562. 
 22. The predecessor statute to section 508.010 was codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 720 
(1929).  The predecessor statute to section 508.040 was codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 723 (1929).  
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the venue of actions against a corporation when sued alone pursuant to section 
508.040 was in any county where the corporation had an office or agent for the 
transaction of its business, there was “no reason why [the corporate 
defendants’] residences should not be regarded as established in the same way 
when, perchance, they are joined as defendants with another, thereby fixing the 
venue under [section 508.010].”23 
Prior to 1943, the “residence” of a corporation for purposes of venue was 
consistently construed to be any county in which it maintained an office for the 
transaction of its business.24  In 1943, however, the General Assembly adopted 
The General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri (“the Act”), which 
introduced the concept of a registered agent to Missouri law.25  Besides 
requiring corporations to which it applied to maintain a registered office and 
agent in Missouri, the Act provided how and when a corporation shall change 
its registered agent or the address of its registered office and the capacity of the 
registered agent regarding service of process.26 
Language in section 10 of the 1943 Act, which today is codified at section 
351.375.2, provides: “The location or residence of any corporation shall be 
deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is 
maintained.”27  Upon the introduction of the concept of registered agent, issues 
relating to corporate residence began to proliferate. 
B. Corporate Residence in Missouri After 1943 
In 1951, the Missouri Supreme Court was confronted with essentially the 
same issue as was before the court in Henning: What is the residence of a 
corporation for venue purposes when a corporation and an individual are 
joined as defendants?28  In the case of State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown,29 the 
 
For the legislative history of the predecessor statute to section 508.010, Henning directs one to 
look at State ex rel. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Gantt, 203 S.W. 964 (Mo. 1918) (en banc). 
 23. Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 565.  In Henning, the corporate defendant was found to be a 
resident of the City of St. Louis.  Id.  See also Smith, where Judge Wolff observed: 
The Henning case follows the common law rule that a corporation’s ‘residence may be 
wherever its corporate business is done,’ that is, ‘where its officers and agencies are 
actually present in the exercises of its franchises and in carrying on its business; and the 
legal residence of a corporation is not necessarily confined to the locality of its principal 
office or place of business.’ 
979 S.W.2d at 192 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 24. See Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 565. 
 25. The General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri, 1943 Mo. Laws 410, 414; MO. 
REV. STAT. § 351.010 (2000). 
 26. 1943 Mo. Laws 419-20. 
 27. Id. at 420. 
 28. While the issue in Henning concerned the residence of a foreign corporation, the issue in 
State ex rel O’Keefe v. Brown concerned the residence of a Missouri corporation.  See Henning, 
131 S.W.2d 561; State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
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plaintiff argued that the court should follow the Henning line of reasoning with 
respect to determining the residence of the corporate defendant under section 
508.010.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, however, stating: 
“Presumably, it is [plaintiff’s] theory that the residence of a corporation is 
wherever it operates and has an office and agent.  That, however, is not the law 
as it is declared by the statutory and case law of this State.”30 
The court in O’Keefe effectively overruled Henning when it rejected 
plaintiff’s argument.  Thus, rather than rely upon the common law for 
determining a corporate defendant’s residence under section 508.010, O’Keefe 
changed course and looked to section 351.375 alone to base its decision.31  The 
court stated that section 351.375 “applies with equal force to venue statutes.”32  
Through its interpretation of such statutes, the court held that the exclusive 
“residence” of a corporation for purposes of venue under section 508.010 was 
in the county where the corporation maintained its registered agent.33 
The decision of O’Keefe effectively created two standards for determining 
venue in actions against corporations.  O’Keefe directed that when a plaintiff 
files suit against both a corporation and an individual, the corporate 
defendant’s residence is the county where its registered agent is located 
pursuant to section 508.010 and section 351.375.34  Yet, when a corporation is 
the sole defendant, venue continues to be in any county where it maintains an 
office for the transaction of its business under section 508.040.35 
C. Criticizing O’Keefe: Anomalies of Statutory Construction 
In subsequent cases, including State ex rel. Whiteman v. James36 and State 
ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen,37 the Missouri Supreme Court recognized and 
 
 29. O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d 304.  The underlying facts in O’Keefe arose from a motor vehicle 
collision.  Id. at 305.  The plaintiff brought suit in Dade County against a Missouri corporation 
and an individual defendant.  Id. at 306.  The corporate defendant had its registered agent located 
in Jasper County, while the individual defendant was a resident of Gentry County.  Id. at 305.  
The corporate defendant, however, had an office for the transaction of its business in Dade 
County.  Id. at 306. 
 30. Id. at 307. 
 31. In 1951, O’Keefe looked to section 351.375.4, which is the predecessor to the current 
codification at section 351.375.2.  MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.4 (1949) (current version at MO. 
REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2000)). 
 32. O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 306. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. The majority in State ex rel. Whiteman v. James conceded that such a statutory 
construction would result in the “anomaly” of a plaintiff being able to sue a corporate defendant 
alone in one county under section 508.040, but not in that same county if the corporation was 
joined with an individual resident of another county.  265 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Mo. 1954) (en banc). 
 36. Id. at 298. 
 37. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
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extended the O’Keefe holding.38  Both of these cases, however, occasioned 
strong criticism from certain judges on the court.  In Whiteman, Judge Hyde 
stated that section 351.375 was not a venue statute, but rather that it merely 
authorized service on a corporation at its registered office.39  Commenting on 
section 351.375, Judge Hyde stated: “[T]he most reasonable construction is 
that it only adds another office (the registered office) to those where service 
can be made and venue established.”40 
In Bowden, Judge Storckman asserted that the majority incorrectly 
construed and applied section 351.375, as had the court in the prior O’Keefe 
and Whiteman decisions.  Judge Storckman stated that the O’Keefe and 
Whiteman “cases seem to regard the provision [section 351.375] as if it reads 
‘for all purposes of venue,’ but it does not have that effect.  At best, venue is 
only one of several purposes involved.”41  He also declared: “[I]t was not the 
legislative intent to destroy the effectiveness of [section 508.010.2] as it had 
been interpreted and construed” in Henning.42 
Perhaps the most ardent criticism of O’Keefe, however, came from Judge 
Wolff in Smith.  There, he argued: 
If section 351.375 is understood to designate the exclusive residence for venue 
purposes, then our previous attempts to reconcile [section 351.375 and 
508.040] do not obey the command of the business corporation statute that the 
residence of a corporation ‘for all purposes’ is to be the county where its 
registered office is maintained.  For venue purposes when the corporation is 
the sole defendant in a lawsuit, its ‘residence’ is a county where it has an office 
for the conduct of its usual business, in accordance with section 508.040, and 
this would conflict with the ‘all purposes’ language of section 351.375.43 
Continuing, Judge Wolff invited the Missouri Supreme Court to reexamine 
its prior holding that the residence of a corporation for venue purposes under 
section 508.010 is the location of its registered office.44  He suggested: 
 
 38. The court in both Whiteman and Bowden extended the O’Keefe decision to apply to 
foreign corporations.  See discussion infra notes 39-43. 
 39. Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 301 (Hyde, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id.  Judge Hyde also admonished: “I do not think [section 351.375] should be held to 
control over the specific provisions of section 508.010 and 508.040, which were intended as 
venue statutes and which were left unamended.”  Id. 
 41. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 353 (Storckman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 354. 
 43. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (Wolff, J., 
concurring). 
 44. “The statute [section 351.375], consistent with the venue statute [section 508.040], 
simply creates another venue choice—not the exclusive venue residence.”  Id. at 195.  As is 
apparent, this is in direct contradiction to the holding in O’Keefe, whereby the court held that 
section 351.375 did indeed provide for the exclusive venue residence of a corporation pursuant to 
section 508.010.2. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] NOTING THE ABSENCE 981 
[T]he most logical way to reconcile the venue statutes and the business 
corporation statute is to hold that a business corporation for venue purposes is 
a resident of a county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its 
usual business (section 508.040) and a resident of a county where it maintains 
its registered office (section 351.375).45 
Judge Wolff sought to revisit the days of Henning where section 508.040 
defined a corporation’s residence and section 508.010 determined the propriety 
of venue.46 
D. Evading the Wind of Change 
The issue of corporate residence for venue purposes came before the 
Missouri Supreme Court during the Fall of 2000 in the cases of State ex rel. 
Armstrong v. Mason47 and State ex rel. Taylor v. Clark.48  The procedural facts 
in both Armstrong and Taylor were identical.  In Armstrong, suit was filed in 
the City of St. Louis; suit in Taylor was filed in Jackson County.  The cause of 
action in both cases accrued elsewhere.  On day one, the respective plaintiffs 
filed suit solely against a foreign corporate defendant. 49  On day two, plaintiffs 
filed amended petitions joining an individual defendant who was not a resident 
of the forum county but who was a citizen of Missouri.  The defendants in each 
case moved to transfer for improper venue.  Yet, when the defendants in each 
case moved to transfer for improper venue, the respective judges rendered 
inconsistent rulings.50 
While Armstrong and Taylor both dealt in part with the concept of 
“pretensive nonjoinder,”51 the cases actually centered on the issue of corporate 
 
 45. Smith, 979 S.W.2d at 196 (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 46. See Rineberg, supra note 1, at 1055.  Furthermore, 
[t]he current construction of corporate residence for venue purposes should be replaced 
with a simplified and more logical formula; one which would lessen the need for 
procedural posturing by plaintiffs by establishing a corporation’s residence for venue 
purposes as either the location of its office or agent for the conduct of its usual and 
customary business or the location of its agent for the service of process. 
Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original). 
 47. State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (no opinion filed). 
 48. State ex rel. Taylor v. Clark, No. SC82915 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (no opinion filed). 
 49. Section 508.040 was the governing venue statute because only corporate defendants 
were involved and venue in each case was proper when initially filed because each defendant 
maintained offices and agents within the respective forums.   
 50. Judge David Mason denied the motion to transfer Armstrong from the City of St. Louis.  
Judge Thomas Clark sustained the motion to transfer Taylor from Jackson County. 
 51. See State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Sweeney, 920 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Mo. 1996) (en banc), 
for a discussion of “pretensive joinder.”  There, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs joined a 
non-corporate defendant solely as a means of attaining venue in the county where one of the 
corporate defendant’s registered agents was located.  The doctrine of “pretensive nonjoinder” is a 
novel one, involving the allegation that a plaintiff brought suit against only a certain defendant or 
defendants initially to establish favorable venue.  No case, however, discusses its application. 
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venue.52  The Supreme Court of Missouri issued preliminary writs of 
prohibition in each case, and each was set on an accelerated docket for briefing 
and argument.  The cases were not consolidated, but were argued serially 
before the court on November 2, 2000, before different panels.  Judge Holstein 
recused himself from the Armstrong case, thereby allowing Judge Spinden of 
the Western District Court of Appeals to sit in his stead.  Judges Covington and 
Benton recused themselves from the Taylor case, with Judge Crane of the 
Eastern District Court of Appeals and Judge Spinden sitting in their stead.  The 
result?  The court quashed each of its preliminary writs without opinion, thus 
allowing the mutually repugnant decisions from the City of St. Louis and 
Jackson County to stand.  The two panels examined the same facts, but 
apparently came to categorically different conclusions. 
Armstrong and Taylor provided the Missouri Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to reexamine O’Keefe and its progeny, to note the complexity 
perpetuated by those cases, and to set forth a new statutory construction.  
Rather than the residence of a corporate defendant hinging on the nature of any 
defendant joined in the suit, the plaintiffs argued that a corporation’s residence 
for venue purposes should be the location of its office or agent for the service 
of process and the location of its office for the conduct of its usual and 
customary business.53  After Armstrong and Taylor, the issue remains 
unresolved. 
While the dual-standard approach for determining corporate venue has 
resulted in a variety of litigation concerning the satellite issues of “pretensive 
 
Perhaps the novelty of “pretensive nonjoinder” is defined by the fact that no statement in DePaul 
Health Center or its progeny requires a plaintiff to join all potential defendants at the first 
opportunity.  See State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) 
(en banc) (stating that “venue is determined as the case stands when brought”) (emphasis added).  
In both cases, the plaintiffs relied in part on this language.  The effect of DePaul Health Center 
has been watered down, however, by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Linthicum.  See 
discussion infra note 54. 
 52. Both Armstrong and Taylor focused on the illogical results that are sometimes 
occasioned by the court’s current construction of Missouri’s venue laws, whereby “the 
determination of proper venue for a corporation turns on the essentially inconsequential presence 
of a single unincorporated defendant.”  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Association of Trial 
Attorneys at 19, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000).  For 
an example of the confusion and illogical results which have been perpetuated by the court’s 
improper construction, see State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en 
banc); State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. 
Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d 820. 
 53. For an in-depth discussion on the idea that the residence of a general business 
corporation for venue purposes should be either the location of its office or agent for the conduct 
of its usual and customary business or the location of its registered office for the service of 
process, see Rineberg, supra note 1, at 1055. 
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nonjoinder” and the moment in time when venue vests,54 the issue of 
importance for purposes of this Comment draws more narrowly from the 
expansive canvas of corporate venue law painted by O’Keefe and followed by 
its progeny.  The focus is on the residence of foreign corporations and not-for-
profit corporations.  Yet, before one can delve into the quagmire that is foreign 
and not-for-profit corporation residence, one must first develop an 
understanding of how the Missouri Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of 
determining an insurance corporation’s residence under section 508.010 in the 
absence of a specific statute that speaks to the residence of the corporation. 
II.  THE INSURANCE CORPORATION DISTINCTION AND THE RETURN OF 
COMMON LAW RESIDENCE 
In 1960, the case of State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield55 introduced a new 
wrinkle into the court’s interpretation of Missouri venue law.  Up until Stamm, 
Whiteman had been the controlling case for purposes of defining the residence 
of a foreign corporation. 56  While the corporation in Stamm was foreign, the 
new wrinkle introduced was that the corporate defendant was also an insurance 
corporation.  Hence, Stamm presented the Missouri Supreme Court with its 
 
 54. The issue of when venue vests came before the Missouri Supreme Court in four cases 
during 2001.  See State ex rel. Fireworks Spectacular, Inc. v. Calvin, No. SC83282 (Mo. 2001) 
(en banc) (no opinion filed); State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001) (en 
banc); State ex rel. Miracle Recreation Equip. Co. v. O’Malley, No. SC83831 (Mo. Dec. 4, 2001) 
(en banc); State ex rel. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Dean, No. SC83832 (Mo. 2001) (en banc).  In 
Fireworks Spectacular, Inc., the plaintiff initially brought suit in the City of St. Louis against a 
nonresident of Missouri pursuant to section 508.010.4.  Plaintiff then amended the suit to include 
Missouri resident defendants.  At the time, none of the Missouri resident defendants were 
believed to be residents of the City of St. Louis.  The issue of the propriety of venue in the City of 
St. Louis was argued before the Missouri Supreme Court on May 10, 2001.  During the interim, 
however, it was discovered that a defendant in the case did in fact reside in the City of St. Louis.  
Thus, the issue became moot and was not decided by the Court. 
In Linthicum, the plaintiff brought suit against a nonresident, individual defendant and established 
venue in the City of St. Louis pursuant to section 508.010.4.  Linthicum, 57 S.W.3d at 856.  
Plaintiff then amended the suit to include additional Missouri resident defendants.  Id.  The court 
held that “[f]or purposes of section 508.010, a suit instituted by summons is ‘brought’ whenever a 
plaintiff brings a defendant into a lawsuit, whether by original petition or by amended petition.”  
Id. at 858.  The Court in Linthicum also noted, though, that DePaul Health Center “does not hold 
to the contrary and still applies whenever a defendant is dismissed from a lawsuit rather than 
added to it.”  Id. 
 55. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).  The underlying 
action in Stamm centered on a suit filed in the City of St. Louis for damages arising out of an 
automobile collision.  Suit was brought against a foreign insurance corporation that maintained an 
office for the transaction of its business in the City of St. Louis and against an individual 
defendant who was a resident of St. Louis County.  Id. at 632. 
 56. Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 298.  See discussion of a foreign corporate defendant’s 
residence infra section III. 
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first opportunity to decide the issue of where an insurance corporation’s 
residence should be located for purposes of venue under section 508.010.2.57 
The court in Stamm began its opinion by referencing The General and 
Business Corporation Act of Missouri: 
The [Act] requires the corporations to which it applies to have and maintain in 
Missouri a registered office and a registered agent.  It also provides how and 
when a corporation shall change its registered agent or the address of its 
registered office and specifies the capacity of the registered agent especially as 
regards service of process.  Sections 351.370, 351.375 and 351.380 of the Act 
govern domestic corporations in this regard, and [sections] 351.620, 351.625 
and 351.630 apply to foreign corporations.58 
It is important to note at this point that, prior to Stamm, the court in 
Whiteman had utilized the relevant provisions of chapter 351 applicable to 
foreign corporations to hold that the residence of both domestic and foreign 
corporations under section 508.010.2 was controlled by section 351.375.59  The 
Court in Whiteman construed section 351.375 to define the residence of 
foreign corporations joined with a non-corporate defendant because of the last 
sentence in section 351.625, which read: “Any such change either in the 
registered office or in the registered agent shall be made in the manner as 
prescribed in section 351.375.”60 
Aware of the court’s reliance on chapter 351 in Whiteman, the court in 
Stamm observed that “insurance companies are not within the purview of 
[chapter 351] because they are among the corporations specifically excepted 
by [the] provisions of [section] 351.690.”61  Hence, the court relied upon 
section 351.690, which at that time read in pertinent part: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to existing corporations as 
follows: 
1. Those provisions of this law . . . shall be applicable, to the same 
extent and with the same effect, to all existing corporations, domestic 
and foreign . . . 
 
 57. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 632.  The court noted that the issue was: 
[W]hether an action may be maintained against a foreign insurance company and its 
employee, or either of them, in the county where the insurance company maintains its 
principal office when the insurance company has not filed with the secretary of state a 
designation of a registered office and registered agent, and the codefendant employee 
resides in a county other than that in which the suit is brought. 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 633. 
 59. See Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 300. 
 60. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.625 (1949) (emphasis added) (repealed 1990). 
 61. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 633. 
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2. No provision of this law, other than those mentioned in subdivision 
(1), shall be applicable to banks, trust companies, insurance 
companies, building and loan associations, savings bank and safe 
deposit companies, mortgage loan companies, and nonprofit 
corporations; . . . .62 
Noting the language in section 351.690 with respect to insurance 
corporations, the court continued: 
The statutes under which insurance companies are organized and regulated 
are Chapters 374 through 381.  Section 375.210 requires insurance companies 
to execute a power of attorney appointing the superintendent of insurance as its 
agent to receive service of all lawful process.  The statutes relating to the 
organization and regulation of various kinds of insurance companies are 
frequently said to comprise a complete code and the exception of insurance 
companies from the operation of The General and Business Corporation Act is 
in keeping with the public policy of the state as expressed in statutes and the 
decisions of this court.63 
And while section 375.210 required insurance companies to appoint the 
superintendent of insurance as their registered agent for service of process, the 
court determined that such statute was merely a service statute—not a venue 
statute.64  Thus, because the language in section 351.690 expressly exempted 
insurance statutes from chapter 351 and section 375.210 did not operate as a 
venue statute, Stamm held that Whiteman was inapplicable. 
The court in Stamm, however, did not stop there in rejecting Whiteman: 
There is at least one other cogent reason why [Whiteman] is not decisive of this 
case.  Section 351.375 applies to foreign corporations only to the extent that 
[section] 351.625 incorporates it by reference, and the last sentence of 
 
 62. Id. (quoting 1943 Mo. Laws 410) (emphasis added).  The current version of section 
351.690 reads, in relevant part: 
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to existing corporations and 
corporations not formed pursuant to this chapter as follows: 
1. Those provisions of this chapter . . . shall be applicable, to the same extent and 
with the same effect, to all existing corporations, domestic and foreign . . . 
3. No provisions of this chapter, other than those mentioned in subdivision (1) of 
this section, and then only to the extent required by the statutes pursuant to 
which they are incorporated, or other than the provisions of section 351.347, or 
section 351.355, shall be applicable to insurance companies, savings and loan 
associations, corporations formed for benevolent, religious, scientific or 
educational purposes, and nonprofit corporations; . . . . 
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.690 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 63. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 633  (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 634.  Compare Stamm’s interpretation of section 375.210 with the court’s 
interpretation of section 351.375 in State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, whereby the Court held that 
section 351.375 “applies with equal force to venue statutes.”  235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. 1951) 
(en banc). 
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[section] 351.375 which was the basis of the [Whiteman] decision is not 
properly includable in the reference.65 
Therefore, the court also held that Whiteman was overruled to the extent that it 
held section 351.375 was applicable to foreign corporations.66  “Because the 
corporation involved in the present case is both an insurance company and a 
foreign corporation, the [Whiteman] case is not controlling.”67 
Although Stamm held that the residence of a foreign insurance corporation 
under section 508.010 was not governed by sections 375.210 or 351.375, the 
court failed to define exactly where the residence of a foreign insurance 
corporation should be located when joined with an individual defendant.  It 
took nearly thirty years for the court to revisit this issue.  In 1991, however, the 
case of State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher68 offered the Missouri Supreme 
Court the occasion to decide that very issue. 
A. Defining the Residence of Foreign Insurance Corporations Under Section 
508.010.2 
“Missouri courts have heretofore established no definitive definition of 
residence of foreign insurance corporations for purposes of [section] 
508.010(2).”69  The task confronting the court in Rothermich, therefore, was to 
put an end to the uncertainty that had lingered since Stamm and establish the 
residence of a foreign insurance corporation.  “Since Chapter 351 excludes 
insurance corporations from applicability, the definition of residence for 
business corporations taken from [section 351.375] has been found to be 
inapplicable to insurance corporations.”70 
Prior to answering the question concerning a foreign insurance 
corporation’s residence, Rothermich chose to summarize the state of venue law 
in Missouri circa 1991: (1) when any corporation is the sole defendant—
domestic or foreign; insurance or business—section 508.040 is the governing 
venue statute;71 (2) when one or more corporations are sued together with one 
 
 65. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 633.  The last sentence of section 351.375 reads: “The location or 
residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its 
registered office is maintained.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.4 (1949) (current version at MO. 
REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2000)). 
 66. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 634. 
 67. Id. 
 68. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).  In 
Rothermich, the plaintiff brought suit in the City of St. Louis against a foreign insurance 
corporation and an individual defendant, who was a resident of St. Louis County.  Id. at 195.  
Venue was based in the City of St. Louis because the foreign insurance corporation had an office 
for the transaction of its business there. 
 69. Id. at 197. 
 70. Id. at 198. 
 71. Id. at 197. 
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or more individual defendants, section 508.010 is the applicable venue 
statute;72 and (3) “for purposes of venue under [section] 508.010(2), foreign 
insurance corporations are treated differently from domestic and foreign 
general business corporations.”73 
Upon the court’s summary of Missouri venue law, Rothermich then 
defined where a foreign insurance corporation’s residence was located for 
purposes of venue under section 508.010.  Under the general venue statute, the 
court held the residence of a foreign insurance corporation is any place the 
insurance corporation keeps an office or agent for the transaction of its usual 
and customary business.74  The court explained its holding by stating: 
Although cases have noted no distinction between business corporations and 
insurance corporations under the venue provisions of [section] 508.040, the use 
of the term ‘residence’ to determine venue under [section] 508.010(2) was 
found by courts to create a distinction between a business corporation whose 
residence was defined by statute and an insurance corporation whose residence 
was not.75 
While Rothermich effectively determined the residence of a foreign 
insurance corporation, the residence of a domestic insurance corporation 
remained undefined—still swirling in the twisted currents of Missouri venue 
law interpretation.  Hence, it would take another case to calm the waters 
surrounding domestic insurance corporations. 
B. Defining the Residence of Domestic Insurance Corporations Under 
Section 508.010.2 
In State ex rel. Smith v. Gray,76 it was conceded that section 508.010 was 
the governing venue statute.  At issue, though, was where the residence of a 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197. 
 74. Id. at 200 (holding “the language of [section] 508.040 . . . to be persuasive in 
determining the definition of ‘residence’ of a foreign insurance corporation, pursuant to [section] 
508.010”).  Venue was deemed proper in the City of St. Louis, since the foreign insurance 
corporation maintained an office for the transaction of its business there.  Id. at 201. 
 75. Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
 76. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).  The underlying facts 
in Smith involve a suit for damages once again arising from a motor vehicle collision.  Id. at 191-
92.  The plaintiff brought suit in Jackson County against a domestic insurance corporation, a 
general business corporation and an individual defendant.  Id.  The Missouri insurance 
corporation had its principal and home offices in Boone County, in addition to other offices 
throughout the state, including Jackson County.  Id.  The general business corporation had its 
registered office in Saline County, with no office or agent located in Jackson County.  Id.  The 
individual defendant was a resident of Saline County.  Id.  The issue in the case was whether the 
Missouri insurance corporation could be considered a resident of Jackson County, thereby 
making venue proper in that county pursuant to section 508.010.2.  Id. at 192. 
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domestic insurance corporation should be located pursuant to that statute.77  
The court in Smith noted that “[a]lthough the 1943 law changed the rule for 
general and business corporations, it expressly does not apply to insurance 
corporations.”78  The court observed that “[i]n the absence of a specific statute, 
the Rothermich opinion followed the Henning line of cases, reading sections 
508.010(2) and 508.040 together.”79  Therefore, by following Rothermich, the 
court in Smith determined that “[u]nder sections 508.010(2) and 508.040, 
foreign and domestic insurance corporations ‘reside’ for venue purposes in any 
county where they have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of 
their usual and customary business.”80 
The cases of Stamm, Rothermich and Smith illustrate the development of 
corporate residence for venue purposes regarding insurance corporations.  The 
Missouri Supreme Court has held that, with respect to insurance corporations, 
the absence of statutory guidance results in their residence being defined by 
common law under Henning’s line of reasoning.  Understanding the rationale 
imparted by the court in Rothermich and Smith is crucial because it serves as 
the foundation for the following analysis vis-à-vis the residence of foreign and 
not-for-profit corporations.  The reason that such an understanding is crucial is 
that, as is the case with insurance corporations, the residence of both foreign 
and not-for-profit corporations is not defined by statute. 
III.  FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE 
It has been established that under section 508.010, the court looks to the 
residence of the defendants for purposes of venue.  Section 508.010 has been 
held to be the applicable venue statue when general business corporations and 
insurance corporations—domestic or foreign—are joined with individual 
defendants. 81  With respect to foreign corporations, however, a preliminary 
question exists as to whether any statute defines—expressly or indirectly—
residence. 
Section 351.375 states that “the location or residence of any corporation 
shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office 
 
 77. Id. at 191. 
 78. Id. at 192 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. (citing Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 198, 200-01). 
 80. Id. at 193 (emphasis added). 
 81. See generally State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc); 
State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. 
Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962); State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 
1960) (en banc); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc); 
State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State ex 
rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); State ex rel. Smith v. 
Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
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is maintained.”82  Due to an express provision, however, section 351.375 does 
not apply to a foreign corporation.83  Section 351.015.6 defines “corporation” 
as used in chapter 351 as “corporations organized under this chapter or subject 
to some or all of the provisions of this chapter except a foreign corporation.”84  
A foreign corporation is defined by section 351.015.7 as “a corporation for 
profit organized under laws other than the laws of this state.”85 
Prior to the decision rendered in Stamm, the issue of the residence of a 
foreign corporation was first before the court in Whiteman.86  As noted 
previously, at the time Whiteman was decided, sections 351.370, 351.375 and 
351.380 directed the manner in which domestic corporations established their 
registered office and registered agent, while sections 351.620, 351.625 and 
351.630 governed foreign corporations. 
A. The Foreign Corporation Distinction Prior to 1990 
Prior to 1990, three statutes directed the manner in which foreign 
corporations established their registered office and registered agent.  Section 
351.620 required a foreign corporation authorized to do business in Missouri to 
have and continuously maintain a registered office and a registered agent in 
Missouri.87  Section 351.625 demanded that any change in the registered office 
or in the registered agent be made pursuant to the manner mentioned in section 
351.375.88  Finally, section 351.630 directed in part that service of process on a 
foreign corporation be directed to its registered agent. 89 
In determining the residence of a foreign corporation, the court in 
Whiteman relied on section 351.625, which provided, as follows: 
A foreign corporation may from time to time change the address of its 
registered office.  A foreign corporation shall change its registered agent if the 
office of registered agent shall become vacant for any reason, or its registered 
agent becomes disqualified or incapacitated to act, or if it revokes the 
appointment of its registered agent.  Any such change either in the registered 
office or in the registered agent shall be made in the manner as prescribed in 
section 351.375.90 
 
 82. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375 (2000). 
 83. See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015.6 (2000). 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015.7 (2000). 
 86. State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc).  Whiteman 
prescribed that the residence of both domestic and foreign corporations under section 508.010.2 
was controlled by section 351.375.  Id. at 300. 
 87. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.620 (1949) (repealed 1990). 
 88. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.625 (1949) (repealed 1990). 
 89. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.630 (1949) (repealed 1990). 
 90. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.625 (1949) (repealed 1990) (emphasis added). 
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As is apparent from reading the language of the statute, the last sentence of 
section 351.625 actually referenced section 351.375.  Because no language 
existed in the provisions regarding foreign corporations for changes in the 
registered office or in the registered agent, one had to look to section 351.375 
for such language.  This reference thus allowed the court to arguably validate 
its finding that section 351.375 dictated corporate residence—regardless of 
whether the corporation was domestic or foreign. 
In Whiteman, the court effectively extended the O’Keefe decision, holding 
that section 351.375 also applied to foreign corporations, thereby establishing 
the exclusive residence of a foreign business corporation to be in the county of 
its registered agent.  Stamm followed Whiteman, however, and overruled it to 
the extent that it held section 351.375 was applicable to foreign corporations.91 
The court in Stamm held that “[s]ection 351.375 applies to foreign 
corporations only to the extent that [section] 351.625 incorporates it by 
reference, and the last sentence of [section] 351.375 which was the basis of the 
[Whiteman] decision is not properly includable in the reference.”92  Therefore, 
since the last sentence of section 351.375 “has nothing to do with the manner 
of changing registered offices or agents, it cannot be said to be incorporated by 
reference into section 351.625 relating to foreign corporations.”93 
Confronted with the seemingly conflicting decisions rendered by the court 
in Stamm and Whiteman, Bowden was forced to further elaborate on the 
domestic versus foreign corporation distinction and again consider the issue of 
foreign corporate residence.  As was the case in both Whiteman and Stamm, 
separate provisions under chapter 351 applied to foreign corporations.  Stamm, 
however, held that the last sentence of section 351.375 was inapplicable for 
purposes of determining the residence of foreign corporations—even though 
that statute was referenced in the last sentence of section 351.625.  Therefore, 
pursuant to Stamm, the court in Bowden could seemingly not consider the 
residence provision of section 351.375 by virtue of the last sentence in section 
351.625. 
Yet, according to Bowden, Stamm was not controlling.94  In regard to 
Stamm’s construction of sections 351.625 and 351.375, Bowden stated: 
It will be noted that these several statutory provisions of the General and 
Business Corporation Act [pertaining to domestic and foreign 
corporations], . . . admittedly, had no application whatsoever to a foreign 
 
 91. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Mo. 1960) (en banc) (holding 
that “[t]o the extent that it holds that the last sentence of [section] 351.375 is applicable to foreign 
corporations, [Whiteman] is desapproved [sic]”). 
 92. Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 634. 
 94. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (holding that 
“[t]he Stamm case is not controlling here, because the facts stipulated and the relationship of the 
parties in that case are not the same as in the case now before this court”). 
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insurance company, or to the particular foreign insurance company involved 
[in Stamm], or to the facts of the case before the court for decision; hence the 
conclusions stated, . . . as to the mentioned sections and the construction 
indicated were unnecessary to the disposition of the case before the court and 
hence they constituted mere obiter.95 
Basically, Stamm went beyond what it was required to decide.  Thus, with 
Stamm no longer influencing the court’s decision in Bowden, the court looked 
back to Whiteman: 
The ultimate decision in the Whiteman case was not overruled by the decision 
in the Stamm case and the criticism of the Whiteman case, whether proper or 
improper, is not decisive of the issues in the case now before us for decision. 
On the other hand, the facts and issues in the Whiteman case directly conform 
to the facts and issues in the present case.96 
As was the case in Whiteman, “[a]s far as domestic corporations organized 
under the general business laws of Missouri are concerned that issue is settled 
by the closing sentence of [section] 351.375.”97  And, as was the case in 
Whiteman, the court in Bowden once again looked to section 351.375 to 
determine the residence of a foreign corporation: 
We think the only legally sound, practical and satisfactory construction to be 
placed upon [section 508.010.2] when considered together with [section] 
351.625 is to hold, as we must and do, that a foreign business corporation 
‘resides’ in the county where its registered office and registered agent is 
located under [section] 351.620.  This conclusion is supported by the decision 
reached in the case of [Whiteman] . . . which has not been overruled, and is 
consistent with the statute applicable to domestic corporations, [section] 
351.375, including the closing sentence thereof, and is also consistent with the 
conclusion reached by this court in [O’Keefe] . . . construing [section] 
351.375.98 
Pursuant to Bowden, section 351.625 was once again found to incorporate by 
reference section 351.375, fixing the residence of a foreign corporation at the 
location of its registered agent. 
 
 95. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).  Stamm actually mentioned in its decision that “[t]he 
contention that [section] 351.625 did not have the effect of incorporating by reference the last 
sentence of [section] 351.375 into the foreign corporation statutes was not presented.”  340 
S.W.2d at 634 (emphasis added).  Hence, Stamm would be hard-pressed to argue against 
Bowden’s contention that the court’s discussion of section 351.375 in relation to section 351.625 
was unnecessary. 
 96. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 349 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id.  As noted previously, the closing sentence of section 351.375.2 reads: “The location 
or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its 
registered office is maintained.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (1959). 
 98. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 350-51. 
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B. The Foreign Corporation Distinction After 1990 
In 1990, however, the General Assembly repealed sections of the relevant 
provisions of chapter 351 pertaining to foreign corporations.  In regard to 
section 351.625, section 351.588 was enacted in its place.99  Section 351.588 
contains no language defining the residence of a foreign corporation or 
referencing section 351.375.  Thus, when the General Assembly enacted 
section 351.588 in 1990, the legislature not only repealed section 351.625 and 
its reference to section 351.375, it enacted the provision without any language 
establishing the residence of a foreign corporation to be “for all purposes” the 
county in which it maintains its registered office.100  Hence, no statute now 
speaks to the residence of a foreign corporation. 
IV.  NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF RESIDENCE 
As stated above, section 508.010 generally governs the determination of 
venue when plaintiff joins as defendants a corporation with an individual.  
However, an exception exists precluding application of section 508.010 when a 
not-for-profit corporation is joined with an individual.101  Per a recent opinion 
of the Missouri Supreme Court, a special statute—section 355.176.4—governs 
venue when a not-for-profit corporation and an individual are sued together.102 
A. The Not-for-Profit Corporation Special Venue Statute and Its Subjugation 
of Section 508.010.2 
Not-for-profit corporations organize under chapter 355.103  A not-for-profit 
corporation is defined by statute as: 
Nonprofit corporations may be organized under this chapter for any one or 
more of the following or similar purposes: charitable; benevolent; 
eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; religious; cultural; social 
welfare; health; cemetery; social; literary; athletic; scientific; research; 
agricultural; horticultural; soil, crop, livestock and poultry improvement; 
professional, commercial, industrial, or trade association; wildlife 
conservation; homeowner and community improvement association; 
recreational club or association; and for the ownership and operation of water 
supply facilities for drinking and general uses; and for the ownership of 
sanitary sewer collection systems and waste water treatment facilities; or for 
the purpose of executing any trust, or administering any community chest, 
fund or foundation, to further objects which are within the purview of this 
 
 99. See MO. REV STAT. § 351.588 (2000). 
 100. See id. 
 101. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000). 
 102. Id.; State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, No. SC 84092, 2002 WL 1364121 
(Mo. June 25, 2002) (en banc). 
 103. See generally MO. REV. STAT. §§ 355.001, 355.020 (2000). 
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section.  No group, association or organization created for or engaged in 
business or activity for profit, or on the cooperative plan, provision for the 
incorporation of which is made by any of the incorporation laws of this state, 
shall be organized or operate as a corporation under this chapter.104 
Not-for-profit corporations also retain their own special venue provision—
section 355.176.4.105  This statutory provision directs: 
Suits against a nonprofit corporation shall be commenced only in one of the 
following locations: 
1. The county in which the nonprofit corporation maintains its principal 
place of business; 
2. The county where the cause of action accrued; 
3. The county in which the office of the registered agent for the 
nonprofit corporation is maintained.106 
In State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, the court held that 
section 355.176.4 expressly provides the exclusive venues in which a not-for-
profit corporation can be sued in Missouri.107  In that case, the court considered 
the narrow issue of whether section 355.176.4 or section 508.010 governs 
venue when a plaintiff joins a not-for-profit corporate defendant with an 
individual.108  In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished similar 
language employed in section 508.040 and drew strength from the variance in 
language used in other special venue statutes previously deemed by Missouri 
courts to provide exclusive jurisdiction.109 
 
 104. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.025 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 105. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000). 
 106. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000) repealed by L. 1996, S.B. No. 768, section A.  In 
1998, however, the Supreme Court of Missouri held L.1996, S.B. No. 768 to be unconstitutional.  
See St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 107. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 2002 WL 1364121, at *5. 
 108. Id. at *4-5.  As an aside, the authors note that the General Assembly repealed section 
355.176 in 1996, enacting in its stead a statute eliminating subsection 4, the provision governing 
venue of a suit against a nonprofit corporation.  L. 1996, S.B. No. 768, section A.  However, in 
1998, the court held the law to be unconstitutional because the law failed to express clearly a 
single subject.  St. Louis Health Care Network v. State of Missouri, 968 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Mo. 
1998) (en banc).  As such, the repealed version of section 355.176, including subsection 4, came 
back into effect. 
 109. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 2002 WL 1364121, at *4-5.  Contrast section 508.040 and 
section 355.176.4.  See also, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 508.050-.060 (2000).  Section 508.050 provides: 
“Suits against municipal corporations as defendant or codefendant shall be commenced only.”  
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.050 (2000) (emphasis added).  In State ex rel. City of Bella Vista v. 
Nicholls, the Eastern District held that section 508.050 prevailed over section 508.010 because of 
the insertion of the “or codefendant” language.  698 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).  In 
comparison, section 508.060 mandates that “[a]ll actions whatsoever against any county shall be 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
994 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:973 
In SSM Health Care St. Louis, plaintiff brought a medical malpractice 
action against a not-for-profit corporation, SSM Health Care St. Louis, and a 
doctor for injuries sustained during birth.110  Defendant SSM filed a motion to 
transfer venue asserting that venue of the action should be determined under 
section 355.176.4.111  Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that section 
355.176.4 applied only when the suit is filed against one or multiple not-for-
profit corporations.112  Plaintiff argued that section 508.010 should apply, 
thereby making the residence of the not-for-profit corporate defendant 
determinative of proper venue.  Drawing an analogy to the aforementioned 
interpretation of the applicability of section 508.040 when suit is brought 
against a for-profit corporation and an individual, the trial court denied the 
motion, holding that the general venue statute governs venue when plaintiff 
joins a not-for-profit corporation with an individual.113 
In rejecting the analogy between the corporation and not-for-profit 
corporation venue statutes, the Missouri Supreme Court focused on the 
difference in wording between section 508.040 and section 355.176.4.  Section 
508.040 provides: “Suits against corporations shall be commenced . . .” in one 
of two locations.114  In contrast, section 355.176.4 directs that “[s]uits against a 
nonprofit corporation shall be commenced only in one of” three locations.115  
Recognizing the insertion of the word “only” in section 355.176.4 and its 
absence in section 508.040, the court held that the use of both the words 
“shall” and “only” in section 355.174.4 signified the intention of the General 
Assembly to restrict venue to only those locations set forth in the provision 
even where plaintiff joins a nonprofit corporation with an individual.116 
The opinion of the court in SSM Health Care St. Louis seemingly stands in 
contrast to its statement in Smith that “[w]hen individuals and corporations are 
sued in the same suit, section 508.010(2) governs.”117  According to the court, 
“section 355.176.4 limits permissible venues for suit against not-for-profit 
corporations only to one of the three locations designated in the statute, even 
when other defendants, including individuals, are also sued.”118  Furthermore, 
because the court held that section 355.176.4 governs venue, the court did not 
 
commenced in the circuit court of such county.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 508.060 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 110. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 2002 WL 1364121, at *1. 
 111. Id. at *1-2. 
 112. Id. at *2. 
 113. Id. 
 114. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 115. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 116. State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, No. SC 84092, 2002 WL 1364121, at 
*5 (Mo. June 25, 2002) (en banc). 
 117. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 118. SSM Health Care St. Louis, 2002 WL 1364121, at *5. 
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consider the issue of where a nonprofit corporation resides under section 
508.010.119 
B. The Absence of a Statute Explicitly Defining the Residence of a Not-for-
Profit Corporation 
With respect to not-for-profit corporations, the court has stated that 
residence is immaterial pursuant to a special venue statute.  The authors 
believe, however, that had the court found section 355.176.4 not applicable and 
considered the issue of residence, the court would have found not-for-profit 
corporations—like insurance corporations—to be a resident of any county with 
an office or agent.  Furthermore, because section 355.176.4 was previously 
repealed but later reinstated because of a finding of unconstitutionality;120 there 
is the potential for the present-day language of section 355.176.4 to change in 
the future.  Should such a change occur, it will be important to understand the 
analysis involved in determining the residence of a not-for-profit corporation 
because a statute does not exist explicitly defining its residence. 
As demonstrated above, the court has interpreted section 351.375.2 to 
provide the exclusive residence of a domestic business corporation when 
section 508.010 is the applicable venue statute.121  It is also important to note, 
however, that not-for-profit corporations organize under chapter 355.122  
Therefore, chapter 351 of the General and Business Corporation Act of 
Missouri does not apply to not-for-profit corporations.  Section 351.015.6 
defines “corporation” for purposes of chapter 351 as those corporations 
“organized under this chapter or subject to some or all of the provisions of the 
chapter.”123  Furthermore, section 351.690.3 provides that “[n]o provisions of 
this chapter . . . shall be applicable to . . . nonprofit corporations.”124 
Prior to 1994, chapter 355 contained a provision identical to section 
351.375.2.  Section 355.170.1(2) provided: “The location or residence of any 
corporation shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its 
 
 119. Id. at *3. 
 120. See St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) 
(finding L. 1996, S.B. No. 768 to be unconstitutional, which had previously repealed section 
355.176.4). 
 121. See State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).  Under 
section 508.010.2, the residence of a domestic business corporation pursuant to section 351.375.2 
is in the county where its registered agent is located.  MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2000). 
 122. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 355.001 (2000); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 355.020 
(2000). 
 123. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015.6 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 124. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.690.3 (2000) (emphasis added).  Section 351.690.3 also 
admonishes that chapter 351 does not apply to insurance corporations: “[n]o provisions of this 
chapter . . . shall be applicable to insurance companies . . . .”  Id. 
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registered office is maintained.”125  In 1990, the court in State ex rel. Steinhorn 
v. Forder126 relied on the residence provision of section 355.170.1(2) to locate 
the residence of the not-for-profit corporation in the county where its registered 
office was maintained.  In 1992, the court in State ex rel. Vaughn v. Koehr127 
also visited the issue of not-for-profit corporate residence.  While the issue was 
analogous to that in Steinhorn, there was a new twist in terms of the party 
defendants.  In Vaughn, the defendants were a not-for-profit corporation and a 
general business corporation. 
Accordingly, the court in Vaughn held that when a not-for-profit 
corporation and a business corporation are joined as defendants, section 
508.040 is the applicable venue statute and the not-for-profit corporation can 
be sued in any county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its 
usual and customary business.128  “If the legislature had intended that not-for-
profit corporations be treated differently than general business corporations for 
purposes of venue, it could have easily so ordained.”129  The court determined 
that “[t]he clear, unambiguous language of [section] 508.040 applies to all 
corporations.”130 
At the time of both the Steinhorn and Vaughn decisions, section 
355.170.1(2) was still good law.  In 1994, however, the General Assembly 
repealed section 355.170.1(2) and enacted section 355.161 in its place.131  
Section 355.161 makes no provision regarding the residence of a not-for-profit 
corporation.  Thus, no statute now speaks to the residence of a not-for-profit 
corporation. 
 
 125. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.170.1(2) (1986) (repealed 1994) (emphasis added).  Compare 
with section 351.375.2, which provides: “The location or residence of any corporation shall be 
deemed for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.”  MO. REV. 
STAT. § 351.375.2 (2000). 
 126. State ex rel. Steinhorn v. Forder, 792 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 127. State ex rel. Vaughn v. Koehr, 835 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).  In Vaughn, 
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against a not-for-profit health care center and two 
other corporate defendants in the City of St. Louis.  Id. at 543.  The cause of action accrued in 
Cole County.  Id.  The corporate defendants, Doerhoff Surgical Services and Jefferson City Bone 
and Joint Clinic, Inc., maintained both registered agents and offices for the transaction of their 
business in Cole County.  Id.  The not-for-profit corporation, SSM Healthcare, maintained its 
registered agent in St. Louis County and operated a hospital in the City of St. Louis.  Id. at 544.  
The plaintiff argued that venue was proper in the City of St. Louis because the not-for-profit 
corporate defendant maintained an office for the transaction of its business there.  Id.  
Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that section 508.040 was the applicable venue statute because all 
three defendants were corporations.  Id.  The not-for-profit corporate defendant, however, argued 
that section 508.040 did not apply to not-for-profit corporations.  Id. 
 128. Id. at 544.  The court in Vaughn chose to ignore section 355.170.1(2) when faced with 
only corporate defendants. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. MO. REV. STAT. § 355.161 (2000). 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
“Venue in Missouri is determined solely by statute.”132  Pursuant to 
O’Keefe and its progeny, the proper venue statute when a corporation—any 
corporation—is joined with an individual defendant is section 508.010.  
Moreover, under section 508.010, residency is a primary issue.133 
Until 1943, no Missouri statute defined the “residence” of corporations for 
venue purposes.134  Prior to that date, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the 
common law rule that a corporation’s “residence may be wherever its 
corporate business is done.”135  Under common law, venue was proper against 
any corporation in any county where that corporation maintained an office or 
agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business.136 
In 1943, the General Assembly changed the law and expressly provided 
that the residence of a general and business corporation “shall be deemed for 
all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.”137  In 
O’Keefe, the court interpreted this provision of section 351.375 to establish the 
residence of a Missouri corporation under section 508.010.138  The court in 
Whiteman and Bowden then expanded its application of the provision to hold 
that a foreign corporation also resided in the county where it maintained its 
registered agent.139  By implication, section 351.625 was held to establish the 
residence of foreign business corporations by reference to section 351.375. 
While the court in Whiteman and Bowden looked to section 351.375 to 
determine foreign corporate residence, the court in Steinhorn did not have to 
look that far with respect to not-for-profit corporations because a statute 
actually defined the residence of a not-for-profit corporation.140  In 1990, 
however, the General Assembly repealed section 351.625 and its reference to 
section 351.375.  Then, in 1994, the General Assembly repealed the not-for-
profit corporate residence statute, section 355.170.1(2).  Since no statute 
currently provides for or incorporates by reference another provision 
establishing the residence of foreign and not-for-profit corporations operating 
in Missouri, a dilemma is therefore presented: in the absence of a specific 
statute defining residence, where should the residence of foreign and not-for-
profit corporations be located? 
 
 132. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 
 133. State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 864 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (Stith, J., 
concurring). 
 134. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 135. Id. at 192. 
 136. See, e.g., State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 131 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1939) (en banc). 
 137. 1943 Mo. Laws 410, 420 (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2000)). 
 138. See State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc). 
 139. See State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); see also 
State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
 140. See State ex rel. Steinhorn v. Forder, 792 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
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Noting the absence of a specific statute defining “residence” of an 
insurance corporation, the court in Smith cited with approval the Henning case 
for guidance: 
The Henning case follows the common law rule that a corporation’s “residence 
may be wherever its corporate business is done,” that is, “where its officers 
and agencies are actually present in the exercise of its franchises and in 
carrying on its business; and that the legal residence of a corporation is not 
necessarily confined to the locality of its principal office or place of 
business.”141 
Prior to Smith, the court in Rothermich had also followed the same 
Henning line of reasoning.  Hence, the same logic used by the court in 
Rothermich and Smith should be applied when determining the residence of 
foreign corporations, since the residence of neither is defined by statute.  
Obviously, as a result of SSM Health Care of St. Louis, the issue of residence 
of a not-for-profit corporation under section 508.010 proves immaterial due to 
the court’s reliance on section 355.176.4. 
The court’s analysis in Henning, Rothermich and Smith effectively governs 
the situation when a statute fails to define the residence of a corporation for 
venue purposes.  Reliance on these cases is crucial when deciding the issue of 
where to locate the residence of a foreign corporation.  Pursuant to the analysis 
undertaken by the court in Henning, Rothermich and Smith, the residence of a 
foreign corporation and any corporation whose residence is not defined by 
statute should be in any county where the corporation maintains an office or 
agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Missouri Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue of foreign 
corporate residence under section 508.010.  Nevertheless, the issue remains 
ripe—dangling on the branch of inevitability.  When the issue finally falls from 
the branch and lands squarely in the hands of the court, it will be necessary for 
the court to look to Henning and the common law of corporate residence to 
delineate the residence of a foreign corporation for venue purposes under 
section 508.010.  As stated above, Henning directs that, absent statutory 
guidance, the residence of a corporation shall be any county where the 
corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its usual and customary 
business.142  Thus, the residence of a foreign corporation should be in any 
 
 141. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); Slavens v. S. 
Pac. R.R. Co., 51 Mo. 308, 310 (Mo. 1873) (en banc); see also State ex rel. Rothermich v. 
Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (recognizing a “distinction between a 
business corporation whose residence was defined by statute and an insurance corporation whose 
residence was not”). 
 142. Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 565. 
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county where it maintains an office or agent for the transaction of its usual and 
customary business. 
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